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Abstract:  
 
Lobbying is a phenomenon which is already present in all political systems and it is not surprising 
if you consider the issue of lobbying within the formal structures of governance of financial 
markets and financial industry in the EU and Kosovo. However, the complex and inscrutable 
institutional structures in EU inevitably result in an inevitable quality of lobbying, which give 
more influence to the stakeholders that have the resources to organize and develop systematic 
lobbying activities.   
 
This paper describes how lobbying of influential institutions groups in EU, involved in decision 
making about financial services and markets, occurs through official channels, such as public 
consultations, and through informal means, such as close meetings between lobbyists and 
decision makers or officials within EU institutions. In this context we intend to rationalize such 
a behavior pattern in the regulation of the financial system in Kosovo.  
 
Kosovo has some fundamental problems in the field of regulation of the financial system and 
financial industry in conformity with the rules of functioning of the market economies. Instead 
of formal and official conversation between interest groups about the regulation of financial 
system, frequently are used corrupt models of influence which later are classified as criminal, 
and often classified as organized crime activities. From this point of view lobbying should be 
considered as a reasonable option within the formal structures of governance of financial markets 
and financial industry in Kosovo.    
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The Financial Lobby and Impact of Other Stakeholders in the EU: 
A good model for emancipation of the financial system in Kosovo  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
By lobbying we understand the influence made by individuals, groups of advocates, voters and 
lawmakers, in making decisions by lawmakers and government officials. Lobbyist is a person who tries to 
influence legislation on behalf of a special interest or a member of a lobby. Governments often define and 
regulate organized lobbying groups.   
 
EU reaches greater political influence on the global level by covering more policy areas, which become 
more interesting for lobbyists. With its expansion in 2004 this development has taken a step forward, by 
bringing not only more new players and interest groups but also a wide range of different cultures and 
traditions
1
. Most important institutional targets are the European Commission, European Council and 
European Parliament. The Commission has a monopoly on the initiative of the decision in the 
Community. Since the EU Commission has the power to draft initiatives, that makes him ideally 
suited as an arena for interest representation.     
 
There are three main channels of indirect lobbying of the Council. First, the lobbying groups routinely 
lobby the national delegations in Brussels. The second channel of indirect lobbying of the Council is 
the lobbying of interest groups to the members of the Council working groups. The third way of 
influencing the European Council is directly through national governments. As a result of coordination 
procedures, European Parliament though attracts attention from lobbyists who target the reporters and 
committee chairmen‟s. Reporters are Members of EU Parliament who are appointed by the European 
Commission to prepare reports of parliamentarians proposed by the Commission and those taken by 
the Parliament.   
 
The highest Institutions of EU, Commission, Council and Parliament, have complicated relationships 
between each other, no parallel in national constitutional settings. For this reason their mutual relations in 
the process of economic and financial governance, are also complex. The Commission is oriented more 
in the markets, The Council reflects more the political orientation of national governments, and EU 
Parliament is responsible for democratic control, very often mixed with some elements of populism, 
which puts him, in a dialectical position both to national governments as well as market forces.    
 
Interest groups and associations use different paths and ways, to affirm their interest in the decision 
making process in society. Their main goal is to increase the influence in the institutions (political 
                                               
1 Currently there are about 15.000 lobbyist based in Brussels (consultants, lawyers, associations,  corporations, NGOs, etc..), who 
try to influence the legislative process of the EU. 2.600 of these  special interest groups have permanent offices in Brussels. Their 
distribution is approximately as  follows: European Federation of Trade (32%), consultants (20%), companies 13%, NGOs 11%, 
national  associations 10%, regional representation offices 6%, international  organizations 5%,  and  experts groups 1%.          
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system) and individuals. Such an action by interest groups and associations in the political process is 
defined as the lobbying. Lobbyists may be members of any interest group or association, in most cases; 
these are professional individuals and agencies that "employ" interest groups or associations, to represent 
their specific interests in the political process of decision making.   
 
In this paper we try to offer an overview of the mutual action between the complex structures of the 
different bodies and different levels of decision making in the EU level, but also to identify where the 
power of the political level decisions is. In this context we will show the important impact of the financial 
industry lobby.  
 
During the functioning of the institutions within the EU legal and institutional infrastructure, often has 
been failures in the regulation or supervision of financial industry in the EU and  at  national levels, and 
that as a result of the ignored warnings were or because they have not been  expressed within the decision 
making framework. In this context, it has been proved that connection with decision making centers and 
interaction with them should be institutionalized and not be developed from case to case. Through this 
process we actually manage to strengthen existing decision making processes and procedures, and make 
profile of structures and institutions for decision-making powers.  
 
Based on this model of the functioning of the financial lobby at EU level, we will try to propose 
a possible model of the functioning of the financial lobby in Kosovo.  
 
 
2. Interaction between EU Institutions  
 
2.1. The impact of legislation and the impact of member States      
 
The legislation used by the European Commission to introduce the new rules of the single market in 
financial services industry, also affects relationships amongst EC member countries. The main form of 
EU legislation in financial services field are guidelines in the form of directives, not regulations. 
Although approved in the same time by the Council in cooperation with the European Parliament, 
or by Commission themselves, directives enable member States to have appropriate and much more 
influence on the implementation of EU legislative measures, than regulations. Directives are mandatory 
for the member States only for achieving the goals, respectively for adaptation of the objectives of 
European Community with the approach in national legislations. In this context, member states 
may choose the form and method for implementing directives in compliance with the legal structure 
of their national legal systems. However, more detailed measures to implement these directives are set by 
the EC regulation. Regulations are laws that have immediate and direct effect in all member States 
equally with the national laws, without any additional actions of national authorities.   
 
2.2. Interaction between Council, Commission and Member States 
 
Academics consider that political control over the regulation and supervision has grown during the years. 
But this does not mean that there is sufficient and appropriate regulation in this field. Rather, we should 
say, there was no enough political will for setting in place a system of regulation and supervision that 
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would be sufficient to ensure financial stability for European Community. With the conclusion that 
regulation and supervision are inadequate agree academics, supervisors and representatives from the 
financial industry community. Lack of political will can be explained by the interest of the member States 
in the protection of national competitiveness of financial services industry against other countries of 
the EU. Commission joined this competitive game of the financial industry as part of Lisbon Strategies 
and was also interested in protecting European Financial Industry competitiveness against its rivals in the 
U.S. and in Asia
2
.  
 
Regulation and supervision more often have been seen as an obligation and cost. For example, capital 
reserve requirements were insufficient to that has been shown by the credit crunch - because there was 
pressure for maintaining the competitiveness of financial industry by keeping low price of capital. Neo 
liberal thinking of member countries, Central Bank, supervisors and the Commission, all were very 
affected by the financial industry, which has explained how the free financial markets allowed increase in 
the financial industry (often seen as speculative), and have done important innovations and contributed 
to the creation of jobs, increase in profit and economic growth in general
3
.  
 
Member states can impose their political will through the acceptance/rejection of decisions on the creation 
of regulatory and institutional infrastructure. While the General Directorate for Internal Market of the 
European Commission has right to initiate legislation for the regulation and supervision of financial 
markets and those of financial services, it depends on the adoption of his proposals by the Council and 
European Parliament. The Council of Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) and the member states are more 
important participants in the process of decision making, then the Council of Economy of the European 
Parliament (ECON). The influence of member States, prior to the submission of EC proposals for 
directive or regulation can be achieved through consultation with the Lamfalussy committees at level 2 
of the regulators of banking, insurance and securities markets. Appointed representatives of member 
states in these committees, give their proposals to the Commission which in reality represent the positions 
and political preferences of their member States that represents a direct influence on the Commission
4
.     
 
However, the EC has final decision making power for the initiated and proposed regulatory measures on 
the EU level. General Directorate for Internal Market of the European Commission takes leading role and 
makes public proposals after college of all Commissions has agreed (that is normal procedure). The final 
goal is the increase of competition affecting the market orientation of financial services and free 
movement of capital. There where relations between the EC and member States are associated with more 
difficulties there is the level 3 and 4 of the Lamfalussy process of coordination. Between the EU 
instructions, interpretations and standards that detail how to implement the directives and regulations and   
the practical supervision and implementation of member states on a national level, there is often a gap, 
and for this reason the level of supervision and regulation is not identical in all member states. 
 
                                               
2 F. Bruni, “The governance of EU‟s financial regulation: Challenges from the current financial turmoil, power point presentation 
London (Chatham House), 25 January 2008. 
3Some of this information is based on an interview with MEP Ieke van den Burgh and other experts, as well as several academic 
articles (see list of literature). 
4L. Quaglia, “Financial Sector Committee Governance in the European Union”, in European Integration, Vol. 30, Nr. 4, 
September 2008, p. 563-578. 
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Besides competition, there are several other reasons why the Member States are willing to use EU 
directives and their measures of implementation. Some of the problems are associated with the fact that 
primary responsibility for the financial supervision is at national level with the objective to be harmonized 
in the European level, but the latter is considered as non-binding. States have different financial 
regulations and along with them different supervision culture, and various institutions and capacities.  
Given that supervision still remains at national competence, this means that expenditures created by 
bailing outs of a failed banks with inter-European operations and payment of its depositors guarantees, 
remains with the national supervision and their national taxpayers. It has been used as an argument 
for keeping the national supervision for as long as there is no system on deposit guarantees and division 
of responsibilities
5
.   
 
2.3. Relations between EP, EC and Council of Europe 
 
Because European Parliament has no power to initiate legislation, it asks Commission for proposals of 
several regulatory decisions and resolutions. However, the Commission may deny these suggestions or 
resolutions, like has done in so many occasions. 
 
Relationships, between the Finance Council (ECOFIN), and the European Parliament Economic 
Committee (ECON), are not very close, although both have the power of interaction for the same issues 
and decisions regarding the regulation of financial system
6
. European Parliament attempts in many 
informal ways to influence ECOFIN decisions, for example, by being present at the informal meetings 
and informal conferences of ECOFIN. The European Parliament also meets with EU presidency and 
invites heads of the Economic and Financial Services Committee of the Council. 
 
European Parliament discusses on how it can have a more proper overview and control over the 
implementation and co-adoption of directives, where he considers that there is absence of democratic 
control over implementation. Commission should carefully consider position of the European Parliament 
measures during the phase of implementation of directives and regulations. They have agreed that the 
European Parliament should have power to interfere when the European Commission exceeds its mandate 
regarding the implementation and measures adopted by the EC
7
.   
 
2.4.  Advisory role of the ECB     
 
While the ECB has no formal role in the supervision of financial markets, its advisory role is a broad, so 
it has informal influence that goes beyond its official mandate. In practice, the ECB stands in many 
institutions of the EU, as are ECOFIN and Economic and Financial Committees of the ECOFIN 
and Financial Services Committees. The ECB has regular relationships, even with the General Directorate 
of the relevant committees (as are the General Directorate of Internal Market, General Directorate for 
Economic and Financial Affairs, and Eurostat), and frequently gives specific suggestions regarding 
financial policy in the European Parliament. Also, the ECB participates in many international institutions. 
                                               
5F. Bruni, “The governance of EU‟s financial regulation: Challenges from the current financial turmoil, power point presentation 
London (Chatham House), 25 January 2008. 
6 L. Quaglia, “Financial Sector Committee Governance in the European Union”, in European Integration, Vol. 30, Nr. 4, 
September, 2008, p. 566. 
7K. Lannoo, “The crisis, one year on”, CEPS commentary, 7 August 2008 
  
8 
 
In this sense, the ECB is able to communicate his opinions and to enclose them in decision-making 
structures of different EU institutions. Publications and statistics of the ECB also play a key role and are 
important in discussions in the EU financial decision-making bodies and procedures. 
 
 
3. Financial Lobby and influence of other stakeholders  
 
Lobbying is a phenomenon which is already present in all political systems and it is not surprising if 
you consider the issue of lobbying within the formal structures of governance of financial markets 
and financial industry. However, the complex and inscrutable institutional structures in EU inevitably 
result in an inevitable quality of lobbying, which give more influence to the stakeholders that have the 
resources to organize and develop systematic lobbying activities
8
. 
 
In this chapter we discuss how lobbying of influential institutions groups in EU, involved in decision 
making about financial services and markets, occurs through official channels, such as public 
consultations, and through informal means, such as close meetings between lobbyists and decision makers 
or officials within EU institutions, Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Channels of financial lobbying 
 
Official channels Informal channels 
 
Public consultation 
 
 
Joint meetings between lobbyists  
and decision makers or officials 
 
 
It is understandable that lobbying by the financial industry is the most influential since it has huge 
amounts of resources to undertake its own lobbying activities and participate in official consultation 
procedures. The consumer organizations, trade unions, and specifically their European representatives, 
are much less influential, often due to their lack of human resources and expertise. 
 
They are far outnumbered by the financial industry in official consultation settings organized by the DG 
Market and the Lamfalussy Committees at all three levels. In areas where stakeholders are not part of the 
financial service industry, they have expertise and know their dossiers. Their contribution can play a 
crucial role on issues of availability of cheap credit, which is related with the regulations on capital 
reserves to be held by banks that provide credit. Small and medium sized industry representatives are also 
very active in lobbying, with some success. 
 
Lack of imbalance of the lobbyists influence is some matter of concern to officials of EU. For this reason 
the EC, has established the Financial Services Consumer Group (FSCG) as a sub-group of already 
existing European Consumer Consultative Group (ECCG). The FSCG is a permanent committee that 
brings together representatives of consumer organizations from each of the Member States and those 
                                               
8Some of this information is based on an interview with MEP Ieke van den Burgh and other experts, as well as several academic 
articles (see list of literature). 
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active at EU level, to discuss financial services policies and proposals of particular relevance to 
consumers. The main objective of the ECCG working group on financial services is to ensure that 
consumer interests are properly taken into account in EU financial services policy development
9
. 
 
The EC also established a Forum of Financial Services Users (FIN-USE) within the context of better 
European financial governance. The Commission committed itself to opening up its policy-making and 
being more inclusive within the context of the social aspects of the review of the European Single Market 
and its objective to ensure that nobody is denied access to a basic bank account. This forum of financial 
services users is to secure expert input during the early stage of legislative initiatives, on the user side into 
internal market financial services initiatives so that a more active and informed involvement of users can 
be achieved
10
. 
 
There are some indices that the European Parliament is considering providing a budget to consumer 
organization representatives in order to increase their human and financial resources to contribute to the  
Consultation processes organized by the EC. 
 
3.1. Lobbying activities of the financial industry 
 
It is a common phenomenon in all areas of regulation that regulators become „captured‟ by the industry 
they regulate, meaning that they take on the objectives of management in the firms they regulate. They 
may thereby lose sight of the ultimate objectives of regulation
11
.  
 
Given the generally weak and fragmented structures of European regulation and supervision, the very 
strong lobbying of the financial industry plays a particularly important role at the different levels of 
decision-making. The level to which the financial industry lobbies and influences the decision makers, 
often depends on the issues and how future regulations will affect them.  
 
Lobbies from the financial industry, make their consultations through official channels organized by EU 
institutions. The main reason why the financial industry is officially consulted is because of the 
complexity of the issues and the lack of expertise and knowledge amongst national or EU officials. The 
EC, for instance, lacks the expertise to deal with the complex financial products and so consults the 
industry. Sometimes such consultations may change the EC‟s proposals.  
 
The EC is very much interested in the view of the financial industry regulation. For instance, after having 
received advice from the Lamfalussy Committees, the EC often seeks advice from business through 
official consultation processes with business.  
                                               
9http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finservices-retail/fscg/index_en.htm: The group has to contribute to: Raising awareness and 
informing EU and national consumer representatives on ongoing and envisaged Commission initiatives in the financial services 
area; Drawing the Commission's attention to specific problems of concern to consumers in the area of financial services; 
Ensuring adequate representation of consumer interests in the development of financial services policy; Encouraging the 
development of financial services expertise among EU and Member States consumer organizations. 
10 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finservices-retail/finuse_en.htm: A conference was organized to that objective pm 28 May 
2008 by DG Internal Market and Services and DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities.  
11H. Benink, R. Schmidt, “Europe‟s single market for financial services: Views by the European Shadow Financial Regulatory 
Committee”, Journal of Financial Stability, 2004, p. 186. 
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3.2. Levels of formal lobbying       
 
At the EU level, DG Market consults widely with the financial industry before a directive is proposed and 
during the follow-up procedures of implementation and transposition of directives. Financial lobbying 
groups are engaged in many consultation processes regarding banking, insurance and securities‟ 
regulation. These consultations include: 
 Discussions at expert groups or working groups officially created by DG Market,  
 Consultations through internet where calls are made to submit written (virtual) comments on 
proposals from the Commission by a certain deadline, and  
 Conferences organized by the EC on specific topics and to which the financial industry is invited.  
 
The process of consultations can have several rounds: internet consultations to provide comments to the 
EC are sometimes requested by the EC after the EC already changed a proposal resulting from a first 
round of internet consultations.  
 
The Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee (ECON), at the European Parliament, officially 
organizes cross party/cross-political discussions with the financial industry. Such meetings are organized 
in the context of the European Parliamentary Financial Services Forum (EPFSF) whose official 
membership only includes European financial industry umbrella organizations, some specific national 
branch organizations, and representatives of very large financial industry players
12
. 
 
3.3.  Informal consultations and lobbying 
 
The financial industry has enough financial resources and uses different ways to informally lobby the 
different levels of the EU decision-making process. The most common forms used lately are writing 
letters and informal meetings. For example, the lobby of the financial industry which individually 
approaches MEPs in written or other ways is strong. At DG Trade, the financial lobby seems to be 
organized mostly informally and through privileged contacts e.g. by meeting the Commissioner or regular 
contacts with DG Trade officials on negotiation documents (which are secret for the public), or through 
questionnaires commissioned by the Commission. 
 
There are many forms of informal lobbing that include, for instance, the Members of the European 
Financial Services Round Table are the Chief Executive Officers or Chairmen of leading European 
insurers and banks. Aside from writing letters and position papers addressed directly to the 
Commissioners and the President of the Commission, and meeting with Commissioner McGreevy, they 
organize meetings or dinners with Ministers, especially from the country holding the presidency. The 
financial industry also organizes its own meetings, such as the Annual European Financial Services 
Conference, at which the Commission and other policy makers are invited and where exchange of views 
and informal talks can take place. 
 
 
 
                                               
12See <www.epfsf.org>: the director, Catherine Denis, and the Financial Industry Committee, chaired by Guido Ravoer 
(European Banking Association) are managing the forum, based at Rue Montoyer 10, B-1000 Brussels.  
  
11 
 
3.4. Activities of the lobby at EU level     
 
The financial industry lobby organizes its activities through a range of ways, such as
13
:  
 Branch organizations or associations have a clear mandate to lobby and involve company 
decision-makers are involved at different levels (EC level or internal industry working groups, 
representation during consultation meetings with EC). Many of them have particular contact 
persons per working group at the level of the EC, Lamfalussy Committees or even the Council 
(ECOFIN)
14
.  
 Some large financial companies lobby individually through their own lobbyists. By being 
spokespersons for their branch organizations during consultations, they also can emphasize the 
interests of their own financial company. 
 Lawyers and consultants are hired by branch organizations or individual companies to lobby by 
providing detailed input that defends their perspective and interests. 
 Revolving doors: members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are being headhunted to become 
lobbyists for the industry, or lobbyists are elected to become MEPs. Some MEPs have direct or 
commercial links with the (financial) industry
15
. 
 
3.5. Lobbying by the financial industry of the EU at international level 
 
It is understandable that the European Financial Industry is also active at the international level and 
lobbies together with the financial industry of other major countries, including the US. This way for 
example, the Financial Leaders Group has been very active during GATS negotiations on financial 
services during and after the previous WTO round of negotiations.  
 
In this context the Institute of International Finance (IIF) is the most powerful lobby organization of the 
internationally operating financial industry, and lobbies at international level such as towards the 
meetings of the International Finance Committee at the biannual meetings of the IMF, and towards other 
bodies such as the Financial Stability Forum
16
. 
 
3.6. Academic Community and the European Council decision making bodies 
 
Although often neglected, academics are often asked to provide their input by different regular or ad hoc 
consultation forums at the EC, the Lamfalussy Committees and the European Parliament. They are 
organized in various platforms. Some of them are organized in platforms such as the Centre for European 
Studies (CEPS) which issues regular publications, briefings and commentaries on financial sector issues 
and the Breughel institute. However, some platforms of academics have more neutral view or independent 
in relation to their ideology or contacts with business than others.  
 
                                               
13
See: http://www.corporatewatch.org.uk/?lid=382#bottom 
14 These branch organizations are organized EU wide, or on a national basis such as the influential and well-connected  
    International Financial Services London (IFSL) and the related LOTIS Committee See: 
    http://www.corporatewatch.org.uk/?lid=382#bottom  
15See for instance: http://www.worstlobby.eu/2008/  
16 In autumn 2008, Josef Ackermann, CEO of Deutsche Bank, was chair and different CEOs of European banks are members of 
    the board of IIF. Downloaded at < http://www.iif.com/about/bod/ >   
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In this context, academics have traditionally not had strong relations with financial regulators and 
supervisors, and because of that many of their warnings and criticism of the EU financial architecture 
have not been heard. In many countries, academics have formed „shadow financial regulatory 
committees‟, for example, in the US, where it started, in Europe, Japan and Latin America. These 
committees meet together once a year, and publish their views regularly
17
. 
 
 
4. Using financial lobbying in Kosovo, and the influence of other  
 
As we mentioned above, lobbying is a phenomenon which is already present in all political systems and it 
is normal if you examine the possibilities of lobbying within the formal structures of governance of 
financial markets and financial industry in Kosovo. In contrast to the model of the functioning of financial 
lobbying at EU level, which is characterized by complex and impenetrable structures, here in Kosovo we 
have a completely different context with a simple institutional structure dealing with financial issues. It 
makes possible that with a solid commitment inevitably produce tangible results in a particular quality of 
lobbying which will give much more influential power to stakeholders that have enough financial 
resources to organize systematic lobbying activities. 
 
In this chapter we try to explain and argue how could evolve influential lobbying of interest groups 
(stakeholders) in Kosovo institutions, involved in decisions-making processes about financial services 
and financial markets. Initially it should be noted that these activities would be conducted through official 
channels, such as public consultations, and through informal channels, as are close meetings between 
lobbyists and decision-makers or officials of the decision-making institutions.  
 
Here in Kosovo lobbying by the financial industry can be considered as one of the most likely, except the 
one that carries the association of importers of oil derivatives, since there are large amounts of funds that 
they have to undertake lobbying activities and to participate in formal consultation procedures. Consumer 
organizations and trade unions are less influential due to the scarcity of financial resources, staffing and 
expertise. 
 
Consultations of this kind could be numerous by the financial industry, within the formal consultation 
organized by the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Central Bank of Kosovo, and 
the Parliamentary Commission for Economy and Finance.  
 
Benefits of such consultations carried out in these instances could play a critical role for the realization of 
the interests of certain stakeholders. For example, a very important issue for the loan market in Kosovo is 
the availability of cheap credit which is closely linked to the regulation of mandatory reserves and capital 
reserves held by banks that provide credit. In this activity could be included also financial representatives 
from small and medium financial associations such as insurance companies, and pension funds, in order 
to be more active and successful in lobbying for their industry. 
 
                                               
17 H. Benink, R. Schmidt, “Europe‟s single market for financial services: views by the European Shadow Financial Regulatory  
   Committee”, Journal of Financial Stability, 2004, p. 163. 
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Lack of lobbying through formal structures of government, financial markets and financial industry in 
Kosovo, makes room for negative phenomena accompanied by corruption and organized crime.  
Moreover, the lack of equilibrium of unofficial lobbyists influence is a matter of concern at official level. 
Therefore, the Government of Kosovo should be establishing the Consumer Group for Financial Services 
as a subgroup of the Consumers Advisory Group. The Customers Group for Financial Services should be 
a permanent committee that will bring together representatives of consumer organizations from each area, 
for instance, banks, insurance companies, pension funds, and microfinance institutions, that are active at 
the national level, to discuss financial services policies and proposals of particular importance for 
consumers. The main objective of the working group of the Advisory Group for Customers in financial 
services industry is to ensure that consumer interests are taken into account in the financial services policy 
development of Kosovo.  
 
Kosovo Government should also establish a Forum of Users of Financial Services in the context of better 
European governance. Government should engage to open the policy process in order for it to be more 
comprehensive in the context of considering the social aspects of the market and its objective to ensure 
that no one is denied access to a basic bank account. This forum of users of financial services 
should provide data for experts, for example during the early phase of legislative initiative, on the side of 
users on the internal market within the financial services, i.e., it would be a way to include much more 
active users and better inform them.  
 
Kosovo Parliament should explore the possibility for adoption of a budget for the representatives of 
consumer organizations in order to enhance their human resources and financial assistance to contribute 
to consultation processes organized by the Kosovo Parliament. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Kosovo has enormous problems in the field of regulation of the financial system in conformity with 
the rules of functioning of market economies. Instead of negotiation together stakeholders for the way of 
regulating the financial system, frequently are used corrupt models of influence which later are classified 
as criminal, and often classified as organized crime activities.   
 
From this point of view it is understandable that lobbying should be considered as a reasonable 
phenomenon within the formal government structures, and within the process of governance of financial 
markets and financial industry in Kosovo. 
 
From the reviews above we understand that fragmented nature of the EU institutional structure provides 
multiple channels through which organized stakeholders may influence policy making processes. In this 
context, the lobbying activities occur at the European level as well as within the existing member states. 
 
In the context of a very complex decision-making process, financial industry has a strong influence  
through well-organized lobbyists teams, both through the official channels as well as through non-official 
ones, through the General Directorate of Internal Market and the General Directorate of Services, 
Lamfalussy Committee, and the European Parliament.   
  
14 
 
 
Other stakeholders such as consumers have less influence. In order to be heard their voice they should 
engage in relevant governmental or non-governmental organizations, national associations, regional 
branch offices, and international organizations.   
 
Academics and financial market experts, some of whom are grouped in their associations, are often 
avoided and their views are not taken into account during the legislation processes and regulations 
amending.  
 
 
6. Recommendation 
 
Lobbying is probably the best way of influence by organized groups today, given the intensity of 
development of the world. Whether in formal or informal ways, there should always be expressed 
satisfaction as well as dissatisfaction regarding financial services quality and cost. There is always need 
for various initiatives to be taken by young lobbyist, as the doors of Europe are open to all. If the 
lobbyists do not reach their expectations, they will at least show that there is something that might 
seem even more different, that there are groups of people who perceive different Europe, and are 
waiting for it to look even more different.  
 
And above all, we can exert our influence in the design and formatting of financial regulation and 
supervision based on feed-back information that we have from the activity and practical operations of 
financial institutions in the context of economic and financial realities established currently. 
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